CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 336

that the blame lay with the illegal regime and that the cessation of talks did not arise from any intransigence of ours over Nibmar and the return to legality. When this had been done it would be possible to inform Parliament frankly of our differences with Mr. Smith over his constitutional proposals. In the meantime the Committee would wish to know that he had spoken in forceful terms to the Commonwealth Press Association on 7th December, in reply to the aggressive and uncompromising

speeches made recently by Mr. Smith. The text of his remarks would be

circulated to members of the Committee.

Should it become clear, as unfortunately seemed probable, that

sanctions were not going to have the desired effect, it would be necessary

to aom in the long term at disengaging ourselves from our direct

responsibility for the Rhodesian problem. The factors involved in this were set out in OPD(67) 93. It seemed that any formal act of abrogation

of sovereignty would present great difficulties, but if the process were

gradual, interested parties might adjust themselves to the idea that the

United Kingdom was no more and no less involved in the Rhodesian problem

than other major members of the United Nations.

In discussion, there was general agreement that the essential first

step was to decide on our ultimate aims and then adjust our tactics

accordingly. The consequences of simply "soldiering on" now seemed even

less attractive than we had thought, and increasingly unlikely to be effective. Through our strict observance of sanctions we were losing on

our balance of payments while other countries were gaining at our expense.

While there could be no surrender to Mr. Smith, an alternative to continuing

our present policy would be to ain at disengaging ourselves in the long run.

This might rouse strong feelings both at home and abroad, but it looked

as though it might ultimately be less costly to us. It must be recognised

that to achieve a shift in domestic and world opinion might take a

considerable time. Under Article 18 of the United Nations Charter a

two-thirds majority of the General Assembly was needed to decide questions

relating to the operation of the trusteeship system: it was most unlikely

that we should achieve this easily or quickly. But we might achieve some

tactical advantage simply by tabling the proposal and having it turned down. If it were decided that disengagement was the right policy we should aim at shedding special jurisdictional responsibility for Rhodesia and retain only the same amount of general responsibility as any other member os the United Nations. If this could be achieved, we should

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